摘要
货币政策和银行治理是银行风险来源的重要外部和内部渠道。选取2002-2014年16家中国上市银行的数据,以固定效应模型进行检验,结果表明银行风险承担与货币政策、股权集中度、股权制衡度、监事会规模、高管薪酬、管理层持股负相关,与第一大股东为政府或国资背景正相关,而与独立董事比例不相关。同时,货币政策对银行风险承担与银行治理特征的关系具有正向调节效应,银行治理的异质性也影响银行的风险承担渠道。为有效降低银行风险,实现金融发展的长期稳定,政策当局需要将货币政策纳入宏观审慎管理框架,加强宏观审慎管理与微观审慎监管,完善银行公司治理。
Monetary policy and governance are two major sources of bank risk. We select the data of 16 listed commercial banks from 2002 to 2014 and use a fixed effects model to test, and the results show that bank risk taking is negative related to monetary policy, concentration of ownership, degree of equity balance, size of supervisory board, executive compensation and managerial ownership, positive related to whether the largest shareholder is government or state-owned, and not related to the proportion of independent directors. Meanwhile, the results indicate that monetary policy positively adjusts the relationship of corporate governance and bank risks-taking, and the heterogeneity of governance also affects bank risk-taking channels. Therefore, the authority should put the monetary policy into macro-prudential regulatory framework, strengthen macro-prudential regulation and micro-prudential supervision and promote governance of banking to reduce the level of bank risk-taking and maintain financial stability.
作者
刘爱兰
王智烜
汤惠辉
LIU Ailan WANG Zhixuan TANG Huihui(China-Africa International Business School, Zhejiang Normal University, Jinhua 321004, China Xiamen National Accounting Institute, Xiarnen 361005, China)
出处
《经济与管理评论》
CSSCI
2017年第1期104-111,共8页
Review of Economy and Management
