关系契约下服务外包专用性资产投资激励机制设计

Incentive Mechanism on Specific Asset Investment in Service Outsourcing through Relational Contract

在服务外包合作关系中,项目执行的结果与客户企业参与程度、服务商的努力水平以及专用性资产投入有关。由于机会主义行为的存在,增加了专用性资产投资的套牢风险问题,同时会引发双边道德风险问题,基于此设计了专用性资产投资的收益共享激励机制的关系契约。通过对关系契约中自我实施性的影响因素的分析与计算,得到了信息不对称条件下服务外包的最优激励合同模型。研究表明:资产的专用度越高,越不利于关系契约的自我实施;当专用性资产内部成本节约率越大,越有利于关系契约的自我实施;而专用性资产外部成本率以及专用性资产外部价值率对关系契约的影响受多个因素共同影响。

In the service outsourcing cooperation relationship, the result of the project implementation is related to the degree of participation of the customers, the effort level of service providers and the investment of special assets. The existence of the opportunism behavior increases the lock-risk of specific asset investment, and cause the double moral hazard problem. Based on this, this paper designs revenue sharing incentives relational contract of the specific asset investment- Through the analysis and calculation of the influence factors on the self-implementation of relational contract, the optimal incentive contract model of service outsoureing under asymmetric information is obtained. Research shows that： the higher the degree of assets, the more unfavorable to the self implementation of relational contract- when the internal cost saving rate of private assets is higher the more conducive to the self implementation of relational contract; the external cost of private assets and the effect of the external value of the specific assets are influenced by many factors.