对工程财务造假的外部审计探究——基于动态博弈

Research on External Audit of Engineering Financial Fraud——Based on Dynamic Game

该文根据工程项目财务造假风险防范的目标,提出四个假设以构建和分析基于不完全信息的动态博弈模型,以发现工程项目管理者和外部审计师的行为方式,揭示外部审计与成本的关系。通过分析发现,加大造假成本和构造信息不对称机制是抑制财务造假的有效手段。

In this paper, four hypotheses are proposed based on the project of risk prevention of financial fraud and the game model construction, a dynamic game model is established based on incomplete information, the relationship of external audit and cost is revealed by analyzing the behaviors the project manager and the external auditor, and through dynamic game model analysis, it is found that increasing the cost of fraud and construeting a meehanism of information asymmetry is the effective means to reduce the financial fraud.