政府补贴、新能源汽车市场价值与企业研发投资——基于交换期权和演化博弈理论的实证分析

Government Subsidies, New Energy Automobile Industry Market and the Enterprises' R&D Investment——An empirical study based on exchange option and evolutionary game theory

文章结合交换期权和演化博弈理论,构建模型系统分析了两种类型的政府补贴与新能源汽车企业研发投资行为之间的关系,并利用新能源汽车上市企业的数据对模型结果进行实证检验。得出结论:(1)在新能源汽车市场发展初期,政府直接研发补贴对企业研发投资的促进作用有限,以开拓市场为目的的政府补贴才能够有效促进企业进行研发投资。(2)在市场价值达到均衡市场价值后,政府直接研发补贴才能增加均衡状态时积极投资企业的比例,此时政府应该逐步减少开拓市场型的补贴,并增加直接研发补贴。

Based on the exchange options and evolutionary game theory, the paper builds a model to examine the relationship between the government subsidies and enterprises＇ RD investment behavior in new energy automobile industry. And use the new energy automobile listed companies＇ data to empirically test the result of the model. The results showed that：（1） In the early development of the new energy automobile market, Government subsidies that aim to expand the market are appropriate.（2） After reaching the equilibrium market value, only direct government RD subsidies can increase the proportion of investment enterprises. Then the government should gradually reduce the subsidies for market development, and increase the direct government RD subsidies.