“逐名”抑或“增值”?——风险投资政治背景与公司成功上市

Grandstanding or Value-added?——Evidence from Political Background of Venture Capital and Listing Qualification

"增值"作用是风险投资区别于其他金融机构的重要特征,但在短视行为驱使下,有可能异化为"逐名"动机。本文以我国证券市场申请上市的公司为对象,研究风投政治背景对公司IPO的影响,以考察在我国当前经济环境下,风险投资机构可能发挥的现实作用。研究发现,具有政治联系风投支持的公司更有可能成功上市;并且当公司为非国有企业、在新股市场"冷市场"时期申请,风投具有政治联系的公司更有可能通过IPO审核;在经济后果方面,这些公司在IPO后的长期市场业绩要显著低于没有政治联系风投所支持的公司。进一步的比较发现,有政治联系风投支持的公司在上市后的盈利能力、公司治理质量都要差于没有政治联系风投支持的公司。研究结果表明在申请IPO环节,风险投资的政治联系有助于所支持企业成功上市,但这更多与风投的"逐名"动机相吻合,而不是传统的"增值"职能在起作用。

Using the companies applying for IPO in China,this paper investigates the impact of political connection of venture capital（VC） on listing qualification.The paper finds that the companies backed by VC with political connection are more likely to get the listing qualification,especially when the companies are not SOE and when the companies file the application during＂cold market＂.But the post-IPO long-term market performance of the companies backed by VC with political connection is worse than that backed by VC without political connection.After IPO,the former＇s profitability and corporate governance are also worse than the latter＇s.These findings show that in China political connection of venture capital contributes to getting the listing qualification,but it is because of＂grandstanding＂effect but not＂value-added＂effect.