独立董事责任保险:助力监督还是逃责帮凶?

Independent directors liability insurance:assist supervision or escape responsibility

本文以2006-2015年我国A股上市公司为样本,以独立董事责任保险的监督效力为研究对象,采用倾向得分匹配法(PSM)、Heckman两步法、迭代式三阶段最小二乘法(3SLS)等方法,考察了独立董事责任保险与上市公司违规、公司业绩及大股东"掏空"行为间的关系。稳健的实证结果表明,独立董事责任保险的引入可以有效抑制国有上市公司违规及大股东"掏空"行为的发生,但对公司业绩存在消极影响。本文的研究对独立董事责任保险的监督效力进行了系统考察,为我国上市公司治理提供了经验证据。

In this paper,we take the Chinese A-share listed companies in 2006 to 2015 as sample,the supervision effectiveness of independent directors liability insurance as study object,adopting the propensity score matching（PSM）,Heckman two-step method,iterative three-stage least squares（3SLS） and other methods to investigate the relationship between the independent director liability insurance and listed companies illegal,as well as performance of the company and major shareholders ＂tunneling＂ behavior.Robust empirical results show that the introduction of independent directors liability insurance can effectively suppress the occurrence of violations of state-owned listed companies and large shareholders ＂tunneling＂ behavior,but it also has a negative impact on company performance.This paper makes a systematic study on the supervision effectiveness of independent director liability insurance and provides empirical evidence for corporate governance.