理性选择制度主义:制度、结构及局限

Rational Choice Institutionalism: Institutions,Structure,and Its Limitations

理性选择理论在政治科学中的具体运用,构成了其蓬勃发展的基础。作为新制度主义政治学的重要流派,理性选择制度主义在对制度进行解释时倾向于将其看作外生性或内生性约束,分别对应外部给定的以及自我施加的博弈形式。理性选择制度主义关注不同环境下制度呈现的结构性特征,以及不具结构性特征的规范和非正式互动模式,从而为结构性制度与不同类型的集体行动问题提供分析工具。理性选择制度主义应致力于消弭自身同有限理性、行为经济学、交易成本经济学、分析性叙述之间的边界,积极突破源自理性选择理论的内在局限,不断汲取进一步发展的动力。

The specific applications of rational choice theory to political science constitute the foundation of rational choice institutionalism's flourishing development. As a main branch of new institutionalism,rational choice institutionalism is inclined to treat institutions as exogenous or endogenous constrains,for external given or self-imposed game forms separately. Rational choice institutionalism pays attention to structured features of institutions under different circumstances,and unstructured normative and informal interaction modes,thus provides tools for analyzing structured institutions and types of collective actions.Through this progress rational choice institutionalism should devote itself to weaken its boundaries of bounded rationality,behavioral economics,transaction-costs economics and analytical narratives,break away from these inherent limitations of rational choice theory,and draw resources for further development.