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移动P2P网络中节点激励机制研究 被引量:2

Research on Node Incentive Mechanism in Mobile Peer-to-Peer Network
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摘要 由于移动P2P网络的开放性自组织等特性,以及节点自身资源受限等原因,移动P2P网络中的节点往往表现出自私性,这极大地降低了网络系统的整体效用.针对该问题,给出一种移动P2P网络中基于交易模型的节点激励机制.该激励机制采用虚拟货币支付方式,并根据节点拥有的虚拟货币量、能量、缓存、带宽以及共享文件资源的属性对每次资源共享交易进行定价.通过博弈分析建立节点的约束机制,激励节点进行资源共享合作.分析与实验结果表明该激励机制能够有效地提高整个网络系统的资源共享交互成功率,降低系统的能量消耗,提高系统的整体效用. Because of the open nature of mobile P2P network and the limited resource of the node,the node in mobile P2P network tends to be selfish, which greatly reduces the overall effectiveness of the network system. Aiming at this problem, this paper proposes a novel incentive mechanism of mobile P2P network based on bargaining model. The incentive mechanism adopts virtual currency payment method, and pricing for each resource sharing transaction based on the virtual currency, energy, cache, bandwidth of the nodes and the property of shared file resource. The constraint mechanism of node is established based on the game theory, which can bind nodes to share resources. Analysis and simulation show that this incentive mechanism is able to effectively improve the efficiency of resource sharing transaction,reduce the system's energy consumption,and improve the overall effectiveness of the system.
出处 《小型微型计算机系统》 CSCD 北大核心 2017年第3期431-436,共6页 Journal of Chinese Computer Systems
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(61572191 61571188)资助 湖南省教育厅优秀青年科研项目(15B125)资助 湖南省计算机应用技术重点建设学科项目(湘教发[2011]76号)资助
关键词 移动P2P网络 交易模型 自私性 资源共享 激励机制 mobile peer-to-peer network bargaining model selfishness resource sharing incentive mechanism
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