随机产出下考虑资金约束的农产品供应链补贴机制研究

Government Subsidy Mechanism in Agricultural Supply Chain Considering Capital Constrain under Random Yield

考虑农业企业融资中存在破产风险,构建政府提供补贴机制下,政府、零售商、农业企业的三阶段博弈模型,给出实现社会福利最大化的政府补贴机制,并探讨政府补贴对供应链各方利益的影响。研究表明:当丰收年发生概率较大,且丰收年与灾害年的产出率比值较小时,政府不应提供补贴;当丰收年发生概率较小时,政府应提供部分补贴;否则,政府应提供全额补贴。政府补贴增加消费者剩余与社会福利,还有利于零售商增收;但只有当丰收年的产出率较高及价格敏感系数较小时,或当丰收年的产出率较低时,政府补贴才有利于农业企业增收。

Considering bankruptcy risks of the agribusiness firm in supply chain financing, three-phase stackelberg game model was set up to characterize the competition of government, retailer and agribusiness firm under government subsidy mechanism, and got the optimal government subsidy mechanism to realize the maximization of social welfare. In the meanwhile, the influence of govern- ment subsidy mechanism on the expected profit of both agribusiness firm and retailer, consumer sur- plus, and social welfare was achieved by comparing with those without government subsidy mecha- nism. It was found that, （1） when the probability of harvest year was large, and the ratio of the output rate for the harvest year and the output rate of the disaster year was small, the government should not provide subsidy; when the probability of harvest year was small, the government should not provide one hundred percent subsidy; otherwise, the government should provide one hundred percent subsidy. （2）Under the government subsidy mechanism, government subsidy could not only increase the customer surplus and social welfare, but also increase the expected profit of retailer; however, the agribusiness firm would only be benefited from the government subsidy as the output rate for the harvest year was large and the coefficient of sensitivity of price was small, or as the output rate for the harvest year was small.