国有企业混合所有制改造中股东间利益博弈分析

The Game Analysis of Shareholders' Interests in the Mixed Ownership Reform of State-owned Enterprises

本文通过构建国有股东、非国有股东和监管机构的三方博弈模型,探究不同主体利益博弈互动关系。研究发现:国有股东侵占非国有股东利益的概率受到非国有股东的上诉成本、监管机构可以获得的处罚收益以及查出概率、惩罚力度等因素影响,判定国有股东对非国有股东的侵占比例是否在可容忍范围,关乎国有企业混合所有制改造的推进步伐。

This paper establishes a tripartite game and regulators, based on the mixed ownership reform in model of state-owned shareholders, non-state shareholders state-owned enterprises equity main conflicts of interest, and explores the different subjects＇ interaction between interests game. The research suggests that：the probability of state-owned shareholders encroaching on non-state shareholders＇ interests is affected by the appeal cost of non-state shareholders, the benefits of embezzlement that regulators can obtain, the probability that regulators can find out this behavior; the definition of occupation ratio range that state-owned shareholders encroach on non-state shareholders influences the reform pace of state-owned enterprises.