农作物保险中农户道德风险的产生机理与案例检验——以内蒙古为例

A Study on the Mechanism and Case Testing of Farmer's Moral Hazard in Crop Insurance in Inner Mongolia

自2007年以来,我国农业保险实现跨越式发展,但其也面临诸多经营风险,例如投保农户的道德风险问题。本文以内蒙古农作物保险为例,界定投保农户道德风险的内涵与类别,分析其产生机理,结果发现:在内蒙古现行"低保障、广覆盖、低保费、低赔偿"的农作物保险政策下,投保农户并不存在事前消极防损和事后怠于减损的道德风险问题,而是存在事前骗保与事后骗赔等属于保险欺诈范畴的道德风险问题;建立健全保险机构在乡、村两级的保险服务体系则是减少农户保险欺诈的关键措施。

Since 2007, crop insurance in China has realized a leap - forward development, but there still exist some operating risks, such as insured farmers＇ moral hazard. This paper, taking crop insurance in Inner Mongolia as an example, defined the connotation and classification of farmers＇ moral hazard and analyzed its mechanism of origina- tion. The results showed that, in crop insurance market under the current policy of ＂low - protection, wide - cover- age, low -premium and low- indemnity＂ in Inner Mongolia,the insured farmer didn＇t exhibited a moral hazard in the form of a passive behavior to prevent loss ex ante or to mitigate loss ex post, but tend to conduct insurance frauds including fabricating insurance objects ex ante or deceitful insurance claims ex to establish and improve the rural insurance service network at the village and farmers＇ moral hazards.