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基于SABL的抗DPA攻击可重构加法器设计 被引量:1

Design of Resistant DPA Attack Reconfigurable Adder Based on SABL
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摘要 差分功耗分析(Differential Power Analysis,DPA)通过分析密码器件处理不同数据时的功耗差异来盗取密钥。运用具有功耗独立特性的灵敏放大型逻辑(Sense Amplifier Based Logic,SABL)设计密码器件可以有效防御DPA攻击。通过对SABL电路与传统加法器原理的研究,提出了一种能够抗DPA攻击的可重构加法器设计方案。首先,结合SABL电路特点得到具有抗DPA攻击性能的加法器电路;然后利用控制进位方式构成可重构加法器,支持4个8位数据或2个16位数据的加法运算。Spectre模拟验证表明,该加法器逻辑功能正确,与传统加法器相比功耗独立性能提升了97%,防御DPA攻击性能明显。 Differential power analysis (DPA) steals the secret key by analyzing the power consumption of the cryptographic device in dealing with different data. By the SABL (Sense Amplifier Based Logic) with power dissipation independent characteristics to design the cryptographic devices, DPA attacks can be effectively prevented. By analyzing the SABL circuit and the traditional adder principle, this paper proposes a reconfigurable adder design scheme capable of resisting DPA attack. Firstly, the adder circuit with resisting DPA attack performance is obtained by combining the characteristics of SABL circuit. And then, the reconfigurable adder is constructed by using the control carry method, which can support four 8 bit operands or two 16 bit operands. The results via Spectre simulation show that the proposed scheme has correct logic function, whose power independent performance increases by 97% and performance of resistant DPA attack is significant, compared with the traditional adder.
出处 《华东理工大学学报(自然科学版)》 CAS CSCD 北大核心 2017年第1期97-104,共8页 Journal of East China University of Science and Technology
基金 国家自然科学基金(61274132)
关键词 抗DPA攻击 SABL 可重构加法器 信息安全 resistant DPA attack SABL reconfigurable adder information security
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