改进贴现因子下的并购博弈成本模型探究

Probe of M&A Game Cost Model with the Improved Discount Factors

采用作业成本法的思想,在信息不对称环境下,将并购谈判视为一项作业,分析该作业产生的成本。在有限理性前提下,基于Rubinstein定理构造谈判总成本关于谈判时长的成本函数模型,并以拟生灭过程结合演化博弈理论,对其中的贴现因子加以改进,将其解释为转移概率,谈判时长作为持续动因构架在中间变量贴现因子上分析对谈判成本的影响,最后从动态角度仿真分析并购谈判总成本随时间的变化关系。

In this paper, with thought of cost - activi ty, in the information asymmetry environment,the M＆A negotiation is regarded as an activi ty, the cost of which could be analyzed. Under the premise of bounded rationality, based on the Rubinstein theorem,it constructs the cost function model of negotiating total cost of negotiating time, and improves the discount factor by combining quasi - birth and death process with evolutionary game theory. It interprets as the transition probabilities, and the length of the negotiations as a continuum of motivations on the intermediate variable discount factor which analyzes the impact on the negotiation costs. At last, we use programming to analyze the change of total cost with time from the dynamic angle simulation.