基于博弈论的新能源汽车补贴问题研究

New Energy Vehicles Subsidies——Based on Game Theory Studies

随着供给侧结构性改革的进行,新旧经济增长动力的转换显得格外重要。新能源汽车作为经济增长新的驱动力,在发展中离不开政府的补贴支持。文中在博弈论的角度通过博弈论模型,揭示政府与厂商在补贴博弈中的策略,说明信息不对称对政府补贴带来一定的困难,同时也探讨了政府补贴对消费者购买意愿的影响,政府补贴与企业生产,消费者效用存在正相关关系。通过三者可能的行为最后说明政府、厂商、消费者在新能源汽车行业中各自的重要性,并对补贴政策提出了建议。

The new energy vehicles as a new driving force for economic growth,in developing without government subsidies. Establish model in the perspective of game theory,this paper reveals the government subsidies in the game with the manufacturers of the strategy,shows that information asymmetry bring certain difficulty to government subsidies,as well as to investigate the influence of government subsidies on consumer purchase intention,government subsidies and enterprise production,consumer utility exists positive correlation. The last government,manufacturers,consumers their importance in the new energy automotive industry,and the subsidy policy Suggestions are put forward.