我国生产者延伸责任制度实施问题的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Implementation of Extended Producer Responsibility in China

生产者延伸责任制度(EPR)是针对解决产品环境保护问题而提出的一种制度原则,具有重要的理论和现实意义。文中通过构建政府与生产者的演化博弈模型,探讨我国生产者延伸责任制度的实施对生产者生态设计决策的影响。结果表明,对于生产者而言,当政府采取的补贴不够高或监管不够严时,生产者会趋于选择不环保的策略。而对于政府而言,当政府补贴成本过高而难以为继,或企业环保意识已经高到大部分生产者都已能够自觉采用生态设计时,政府倾向于选择不严格的监管策略,除此之外,政府都倾向于严格监督生产者的行为。

The Extended Producer Responsibility（EPR） legislation is a kind of principle which is put forward to solve the life-cycle environmental problems of products and has significant implications for theory and practice. In this paper,we built a evolutionary game model involving producers and government,which examine the EPR policy in our country from the perspective of ecological design. The result shows that when the government subsidies are too low or not enough heavily regulated,producers tend to choose pollution. While for the government,unless the government subsidies unsustainable cost was too high,or the consciousness of environmental protection of enterprise has high to most producers have been able to use the ecological design,otherwise,the government tends to strictly monitor the behavior of the producers.