摘要
长期以来,不少人认为在中央红军长征前后,蒋介石为了实现某种目的特别是统一西南,故意放中共突围,并驱赶其进入云贵川。这种说法的依据主要有二:其一,蒋介石未倾其全力"追剿",只派部分中央军尾随,而将主力部队留置于江西进行"清剿";其二,担负"追剿"任务的国民党中央军在湖南没有与红军发生大的战斗,甚至一路"护送"红军。事实上,这两个推测都不能成立。之所以会出现上述情况,是由各种复杂因素造成的,有时还带有历史的机缘巧合。在此决策过程中,虽然不乏蒋介石的工于心计及其与地方实力派的相互博弈,但不宜简单断言他有意"放水"。
For a long period of time, many people argued that before and after Long March, in order to achieve some purpose especially the unity of the southwest China, Chiang Kai-Shek deliberately released the Red Army, and drove it into the Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan Area. This argument was based on two facts:First of all, Chiang did not try its best to pursuit, only sent part of the central army to follow, and retained the main force in Jiangxi; Secondly, the KMT Central Army in Hunan did not wage big battles with the Red Army,and even escorted them. In fact, both two assumptions cannot be established. The above situation was caused by a variety of complex factors, and sometimes accompanied by historical coincidence. In the decision-making process, although we can see Chiang had comprehensive intentions and his gaming with the local strength, one should not simply assert that Chiang intended to let the Red Army succeed.
出处
《中共中央党校学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第1期100-104,共5页
Journal of The Party School of The Central Committee of The C.T.C
关键词
红军
长征
蒋介石
“放水”
“追剿”
the Red Army
Long March
Chiang Kai-Shek
let the Red Army Go
Pursuit