制度距离对中国企业跨国收购股权选择的影响

Institutional Distance and Ownership Choice of Chinese Companies' Cross-border Acquisitions: The Moderating Impact of the Relative Institutional Quality of the Host Country

综合考虑跨国收购中制度距离引发的外来者劣势和制度套利两种效应,利用Zephyr数据库中2010-2014年中国企业海外收购的302个样本,探讨了规制制度距离、规范制度距离以及东道国的相对制度质量与我国企业海外收购股权选择之间的关系。研究发现:规制制度距离越大,海外收购股权比例越高;规范制度距离越大,跨国收购股权比例越低。东道国的制度质量对制度距离和收购股权比例之间的关系具有一定的调节作用,说明中国企业在进入制度质量较高的国家时,制度套利的作用更加明显。

Integrating liability of foreignness and institutional arbitrage perspectives in cross-border acquisitions,we study the ownership choice of Chinese companies' cross-border acquisitions,and discuss the relation of the regulative and normative institutional distances between China and the host countries,the multiple institutional qualities and the ownership choice. The sample comprises 302 acquisitions by acquirers from China from 2010 to 2014. W e find that the greater the regulative distance,the higher the share holding ratio of cross-border acquisitions; the greater the normative distance,the lower the share holding ratio of cross-border acquisitions. In addition,we investigate the potential moderators,find the relative institutional qualities of the host country moderate the relationship between institutional distance and the share holding ratio of cross-border acquisitions,indicating that Chinese companies' institutional arbitrage is more obvious in acquiring the targets from the countries with relative greater institutional quality.