无语境的“自我”--胡塞尔的“源我”观与西田几多郎的“自我”概念

Non-Contextual Self: Husserl's Concept of “Primal I”and Nishida's Concept of the Self

从现象学角度看,在所谓的"源初视角"中,吾辈便已对世界与他者有所体验。"我们究竟该如何描述此类视角?"在哲学史上却成为了一个引发诸多争论的难题。对"我"而言,"我自己的视角"是吾辈能够体验到的唯一视角。这也就是说,在"我的"经验之中,"我"是无法逾越出"我自己的视角"的。不过,"我"同时也知道,世间还有许多不同于"我自己的视角"的其他视角。这就意味着:因为某些缘由,尽管"我"无法逾越自身的视角,"我"还是能够知道处于"我自己的视角"之外的世界的某些情况。要回答此问题,殊为不易。在本文中,笔者将首先从埃德蒙德·胡塞尔之现象学的立场出发,着手处理"我"是怎样在不离开"我自己视角"的同时,却又认识到他者的视角这个问题。在笔者看来,胡塞尔对于相关问题的回答,似乎是通过他对"源我(德语:Ur-Ich)"的深入思考来完成的。笔者倾向于将"源我"解释为一种"无语境的自我"。在对"无语境自我"的含义作出更深入的解释之后,笔者将沿用反思胡塞尔"源我"概念所取得的思想成果,比照活跃于二十世纪上半叶的日本哲学家西田几多郎(1870~1945)所提出的两个哲学概念:"纯粹经验"与"场所"。依照西田的理论,"纯粹经验"是先在于作为个体的"自我"而存在的,并非由于存在着个体,所以才有经验,而是因为存在着经验,所以才有个体。笔者试图表明,西田的这一看似怪异的思想,乃是我们理解"自我"和"他者"之间微妙关系的一把钥匙。按照西田的想法,一方面,个体只能够在特定的语境之中出场;而在另一方面,却还有着一种无法被纳入任何语境的源初经验。西田完成了对于这种"无语境"的源初经验的透彻刻画,也恰恰是经由这种"无语境"的自我经验,吾辈才可能把"自我"体验为一个与其他个体有所区别的个体。

How can I describe the original perspective from which I am experiencing the world and others？ Seemingly there is no problem here. What is problematic about this topic？ Let us think about ＂my＂own perspective. For me,it is the only perspective from which I can experience. It is obvious that in my experience I cannot go beyond this perspective. Nevertheless,I know that there are other perspectives that are different from mine. This means that for some reason,I know the outside of my perspective although I cannot go beyond it. How can I get acquainted with such perspectives other than mine without leaving my own perspective？ This is a problem that cannot easily be solved. In this paper,I first approach this problem from the standpoint of Edmund Husserl＇s phenomenology. Husserl seems to answer to the question about ＂my＂original perspective by his meditation on the ＂primal I＂（ Ur-Ich）. I will analyze this strange but thought-provoking concept of ego by interpreting it as a kind of ＂non-contextual self. ＂Second,I will compare the result of this consideration of Husserl＇s ＂primal I＂with the concept of ＂pure experience＂（ 纯粹经验）and ＂basho＂（ 场所） proposed by Nishida Kitaro（ 西田几多郎）,a Japanese philosopher who worked in the first half of the twentieth century. According to Nishida,＂pure experience＂precedes our ego as an individual. He notes： ＂It is not that there is experience because there is an individual, but that there is an individual because there is experience＂. I try to show that this seemingly strange idea might be necessary for our understanding of self and others.Individuals can only appear in a certain context,whereas there is a sort of experience that does not fit in any context.Nishida seems to make thorough the description of such ＂non-contextual＂self-experience,which makes it possible for us to experience the self as an individual different from other individuals.