政治选举、管理层风险异质性与公司投资

Political Election、Management Risk Preference Diversity and Corporation Investment

本文结合中国特殊的制度背景,从管理层风险异质性这一视角来考察政治不确定性对公司投资的影响。研究发现,在中央政府进行政治选举的年份,风险规避型管理层更倾向于降低投资。本研究的政策启示在于:政府应该完善现有的制度,减少政治选举对企业投资带来的外部风险,从而保证稳定的公司投资水平;对于企业而言,应加快完善公司治理机制,制定合理的投资战略从而促使管理层在面对外部不确定性时保持应有的谨慎性。

Considering Chinese special system background, we study the effect of political uncertainty on the corporate investment from an angle of management risk preference. Our study found that, risk aversion management is more inclined to reduce investment expenditure under this background. Policy implications of this study is that the government should improve the existing system, reduce the external risk of political election to the enterprise investment, so as to ensure the stability of the company investment. For enterprises, they should improve corporate governance,and make reasonable investment strategies to help management hold cautious attitude in the face of external uncertainties.