风险中性零售商的合作广告策略与订货模型

Cooperative Advertising Strategy and Ordering Model with Risk-neutral Retailer

考虑了由一个制造商与一个零售商构成的单期二阶段供应链是否进行合作广告的博弈问题.面对市场需求的不确定性,零售商从制造商处订购报童类型产品销售给消费者,零售商具有风险中性的行为特征.通过不合作广告与合作广告两种情形,制造商与零售商进Stackelberg主从博弈,得到了均衡解,比较后发现,合作广告下的最优解及利润总是优于不合作广告下的最优解和利润,告诉了上下游企业采用合作广告的广告策略.最后,通过数值算例,给出了需求敏感系数对最优决策的影响,同时也论证了有关结论.

We consider a game problem whether there is the cooperative advertising strategy based on a one-period two-echelon supply chain with one manufacture and one 1 retailer. Facing the uncertainty of market demand, the retailer order newsboy type product sales to consumers from the manufacturer and the retailer is risk neutral. Through the non-cooperative advertising and cooperative advertising two kinds of situations, the Stackelberg equilibrium solution is obtained, the optimal solution and profit under cooperative advertising is always better than the optimal solution and profit under non-cooperative advertising, meanwhile, also told us that the upstream and downstream enterprises have the cooperative advertising motivation. Finally, a numerical example is given to demonstrate the influence of the demand sensitivity coefficient on the optimal decision, and the relevant conclusions are proved.