员工离职成本与企业在职培训

TURNOVER COST AND FIRM-SPONSORED TRAINING

假设员工转换工作的"离职成本"是员工的私人信息,对企业而言服从特定分布,企业对员工采取(买方的)三级区别定价。企业的在职培训既提高员工的劳动生产率,又改变员工离职成本的分布,最终影响员工的离职率和"生产率—工资"之差。这两个作用都会影响企业投资于在职培训的激励。已有文献仅关注后一个激励,本文模型则二者兼顾,研究了企业在职培训的决定因素,以及企业培训与员工离职的关系。本文证明,即使没有压缩的工资结构,企业仍有激励提供一般性员工培训。较高的离职率也可以伴随着较高的培训水平,从而同时实现培训效率和劳动力配置效率。本文认为这是欧洲"双元制"培训体系的成功经验,可作为我国经济转型升级的政策参考。

This paper discusses the relationship between employee turnover costs and firm-sponsored training. Turnover costs are workers＇ private information which follows certain distributions. Firms offer different wages to inside workers and outside workers. Firm＇s on-the-job training influences workers＇ productivities as well as turnover costs. The ＂compressed wage structure＂ （CWS） theory in the literature only consider wage-productivity differential. This paper considers a labor market with duopolistic employers, where turnover rats and training levels are endogenous. It is suggests that CWS is not the only reason that firms invest in general training. Higher turnover rate can be associated with more training, which means efficient training and efficient allocation may be gotten both at the same time. More sophisticated implications are offered for enterprises management and social policies, for instance, the dual training system in Germany and some other countries.