基于消费者偏好的非对称企业定向广告投放策略

Strategy of asymmetric duopolist sending targeted advertising based on consumer's preference

为了研究消费者偏好对产品定价和定向广告策略的影响,构建非对称双寡头企业联用定向广告和价格歧视策略对企业利润影响的数学模型,并进行案例分析.研究表明:1)消费者偏好属性直接影响企业利润.当不允许价格歧视时,企业总在优势市场投放更高强度的定向广告以获得更高利润.2)当允许价格歧视时,企业将在优势市场投放定向广告并制定较高价格,而在竞争市场给予消费者较低价格以获得最优利润.3)定向广告和价格歧视联用成为企业定向营销的有效工具.当企业不具备完全定向精度时,同时采取定向广告和价格歧视策略有可能加剧市场竞争.

To explore the effects of consumer＇s preference on product pricing and targeted advertising, the mathematical model with asymmetric dnopolist using targeted advertising and price discrimination on firm＇s profit is established, and related case study is performed. The results indicate that consumer＇s preference directly affects the firm＇s profit. More targeted advertising are sent to the firm＇s strong market for higher benefits even the price discrimination is not allowed. However, when the price discrimination is permitted, both firms will send more ads in their strong market and provide a high price to the consumer. Otherwise, the strategy of price discrimination and targeted advertising can be used as the effective tool for firm＇s marketing strategy. When the firm has the imperfect targeting precision, the strategy of targeted advertising and price discrimination might intensify market competition.