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网上代销双渠道闭环供应链的定价与协调决策 被引量:2

Pricing and Coordination Strategy of Online Agent Selling Dual Channel Closed-loop Supply Chain
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摘要 制造商在双渠道闭环供应链中开通传统零售及网上代销双渠道,其中,传统渠道零售商销售其产品,并负责回收废旧产品;而网上零售商代销其产品,并收取代销佣金。本文分析了集中决策、制造商Stackelberg博弈决策、制造商和零售商Bertrand博弈决策三种决策模式中制造商的定价策略,同时运用纳什讨价还价模型进行了协调。结果表明:在两种分散决策中,Bertrand博弈决策模式中的批发价格、传统渠道零售价格和制造商的利润最大,而网上渠道零售价格、零售商的利润和整体利润最小;相较于两种分散决策而言,集中决策中的传统渠道零售价格和整体利润最小,网上渠道零售价格最大;制造商和零售商的讨价还价能力越强,其在利益分配机制中所获得的利润就越多。 In the dual channel closed-loop supply chain,the manufacturer has opened traditional retail channel and network agent selling channel.The traditional retail channel retailer is responsible for selling products and recycling waste products;the online retailer agents for the sale and charges a commission.In this paper,the pricing strategy of the manufacturer in the three decision-making models is studied,which is the centralized decision making,the manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game,the manufacturer and the retailer' Bertrand game,and the Nash bargaining model is used to coordinate the results.Results show that wholesale price,traditional channel retail price and manufacturer' s profit are higher in two kinds of decentralized decision making,while the retail price of online channels,retailer's profit and the overall profit are lower in Bertrand game;compared to two kinds of decentralized decision making,centralized decisionmaking's traditional channel retail price and overall profit are the lowest,online channel retail price is the highest;the stronger the bargaining power of manufacturers and retailers,the more profit in the profit distribution mechanism.
作者 梁喜 郭瑾
出处 《商业研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2017年第2期1-11,共11页 Commercial Research
基金 重庆市自然科学基金计划项目"考虑产业集群升级与新产品合作开发的闭环供应链协调优化模型及其应用研究" 项目编号:2012jj A00028
关键词 双渠道闭环供应链 交叉价格弹性系数 佣金比例系数 回收率 纳什讨价还价模型 dual channel closed-loop supply chain cross price elasticity coefficient commission ratio coefficient recovery rate Nash bargaining model
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