心灵何以具有自然因果性——以戴维森为例对自然化理论的探究

How Can The Mind Change The World:Investigation on the Naturalistic Philosophy of Mind proposed by Davidson

本文通过具体分析戴维森解决"心理因果性问题"的方案以及金在权等人对他的批评,指出了后者对戴维森的一些误解。我们将说明,戴维森的"无律则一元论"实际上并不会面对金在权"排除论证"的直接冲击。就此而言,把戴维森称为"非还原"的物理主义者,这种做法其实并不恰当。从基本的思想倾向上来看,戴维森的自然主义思想比物理主义更为宽泛,其精神更接近于麦克道威尔以及斯特劳森等人的自然观。概略地说,这类自然观的核心就在于,他们既希望将人类理性(或"理性空间")纳入到一个统一的自然图景之中,又想要确保心灵相对于物理世界的独立性和意义。

Anomalous Monism is a theory proposed by Davidson aiming at solving the Problem of Mental Causation. Through the analysis of this theory and the criticism levelled at it（proposed by Kim）, we contend that Davidson was actually misunderstood by Kim. We will clarify that Kim＇s ＂Exclusion Arguments＂ has not hit at the nub of Anomalous Monism. In this sense, it is not appropriate to regard Davidson as a ＂non-reductive＂ physicalist. On the basic ideological tendency of Davidson＇s naturalism, his ideas are more extensive than Physicalism, and closer to McDowell and Strawson. Roughly speaking, the core idea proposed by them is to take the reason into a unified view of Nature, and to ensure the autonomy of mind relative to the physical world.