基于敬业理论的生产型员工成本控制契约研究

Researchon the Cost Control Contract of Production Employees Based on the Engagement Theory

在制造业企业成本控制活动中,管理者和生产型员工间产生了委托代理问题,并由此签订成本控制契约。由于员工敬业行为对其成本控制业绩产生着影响,因而将敬业度引入成本控制契约,研究了员工成本控制能力、努力成本和管理者精神激励成本等变量对员工最优风险分担、敬业度、努力程度和管理者最优收益的影响。研究结果表明:最优风险分担系数和本职最优努力水平、员工成本控制能力呈正相关,与努力成本、风险偏好程度、风险方差呈负相关;最优行为敬业度和最优额外努力水平与员工能力呈正相关,与努力成本、管理者精神激励成本呈负相关;最优总努力水平和管理者最优收益与员工能力、特质敬业度呈正相关,与努力成本、风险偏好程度、风险方差、管理者精神激励成本呈负相关。

In the cost control activities of manufacturing enterprises, principal-agent problemhappens between managers and production employees, and then they sign the cost controlcontract. Because employees＇ engagement affects their cost control performance, the engagementwas introduced into the cost control contract. The effects of employees＇ cost control ability,efforts cost, and manager＇s spiritual incentive cost on the optimal risk sharing, engagement, effortlevel, and manager＇s optimal profit were studied. Results show that the optimal risk sharingcoefficient and employee＇s optimal own effort is positively related with the cost control ability,and is negatively related with the efforts cost, risk aversion and the variance of the external riskfactors. The optimal behavioral engagement and the optimal extra effort are positively related withthe cost control ability, and are negatively related with the efforts cost and manager＇s spiritualincentive cost. The optimal total effort level and manager＇s optimal profit are positively relatedwith the cost control ability and trait engagement, and are negatively related with the efforts cost,risk aversion, the variance of the external risk factors and manager＇s incentive cost.