公司内部治理能阻止财务多元化战略吗

Can Corporate Internal Governance Prevent Financial Diversification

没有资源协同效应的财务多元化战略,是排除了组织寻求自身"价值最大化"动机之后的股东与管理者之间"代理冲突"的直接体现。基于期望理论,本文沿着两条路径分析了公司内部治理作为一种制度设计如何影响高管实施财务多元化战略的行为:(1)公司内部治理中控制机制的不同水平会影响高管实施财务多元化战略的可能性大小,即"期望值";(2)不同程度的利益一致设计会影响高管的风险感知,进而影响其实施财务多元化战略降低雇佣和收入风险的"效价"满足。本研究通过使用2011-2014年沪深两市A股上市公司的面板数据,及根据公司上市板块和所有权性质不同将样本进一步划分,运用FGLS回归发现,控制机制中的董事会独立性及董事长与总经理两职分离能够显著降低财务多元化水平,这在主板上市公司中更为显著。进一步研究发现,当自由现金流水平高的时候,董事会的独立性在降低财务多元化水平时更为有效,表明当存在充裕的自由现金流时,一个独立的董事会能提高监督过程中的"警惕性",更能发挥它的监督职能。与代理理论不同的是,利益一致设计的高管薪酬敏感度增加了高管可感知的风险,进而增加而不是降低了财务多元化水平,这种现象当自由现金流水平较高的时候尤为显著。

Financial diversification strategy consists of diversifying a firm＇s business portfolio to allow revenue smoothing between the firm＇s business lines. Revenue smoothing is supposed to reduce the firm＇s risk, however, this may not create and may even destroy value for shareholders, given that shareholders can equally or even more efficiently diversify their own investment portfolio. Therefore, financial diversification strategy is the direct reflection of the agen- cy conflict between shareholders and managers which ruled out the value maximization motivation of organization. Based on the view of expectancy theory, this article analyzes how corporate internal governance as an institutional design can impact the behavior of se- nior managers to implement financial diversification strategy from two paths： （1） Different levels of control mechanism can impact the＂possibility＂ of implementing financial diversification strategy, that is the ＂expectations＂; （2） Different levels of interest alignment can impact the perceived risk of senior managers, thus can impact the ＂valence＂ of implementing financial diversification strategy to re- duce the risk of employment and income. In a sample of A-category share listed companies during 2011-2014, according to different listing board and,ownership properties, we further divide our com- panies into main-board and small and medium-board listed compa- nies, state-owned and non-state-owned listed companies, and use the FGLS regress to test our hypotheses. Results show that the con- trol mechanism board independence and chairman/CEO non-dual- ity can significantly lower levels of financial diversification, which is more significant in main-board sample. Further study finds out that： in the case of high levels of free cash flow, board independence is more effective, and this shows that when there is plenty of free cash flow, independent directors will improve ＂vigilance＂ in the process of their supervision, can better play its supervisory func- tions; In contrast to the agency theory, senior managers＇ variable compensation increases the perceived risk, thus increases financial diversification rather than reducing the financial diversification, this phenomenon is especially significant at high levels of free cash flow.