媒体负面报道影响并购成败吗——来自上市公司重大资产重组的经验证据

Does Negative Coverage Affect the Success or Termination of M&A:Evidence from Material Assets Reorganization

重大资产重组在优化资源配置、推动国企改革、促进产业结构升级等方面发挥了积极作用,也是资本市场研究的热点问题。本文从媒体的社会"守望"功能出发,实证检验媒体负面报道对上市公司重大资产重组成败的影响。以2008年1月至2015年7月沪深两市481次重大资产重组为样本,本文研究发现,负面报道显著提高了公司主动终止重组计划和重组方案未通过并购重组委员会审核的概率,进而提高了重组失败的概率;在重组过程中,不同时间段的负面报道对重组进展的影响不同,表现出了明显的时效性;同时,与资产质量相关的负面报道提高了公司主动终止重组的概率;而与资产定价相关的负面报道提高了重组方案审核不通过的概率。研究结果表明,负面报道在上市公司重大资产重组过程中发挥了重要的事中监督作用及公司治理作用,扮演了积极的资本市场"守望者"角色。

The material assets reorganization plays an active role in optimizing the allocation of resources, pushing the reform of state- owned enterprises forward, promoting the upgrading of the indus- trial structures and so on. The roles and impacts of the media on the corporate governance sphere have long been a hot issue of financial research. This paper explores the process control function of media, rather than focusing on the post-supervision. Since media play a role in surveillance of the environment, this paper studies the effect of negative coverage on the success of material assets reorganization of listed companies empirically. Using a sample of 481 material as- sets reorganization events in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets within the period January 2008 to July 2015, we found that negative coverage increases the probability of the voluntary termination of the reorganization plan. And negative coverage improves the chanceof Merge Reorganization Examination Committee＇s rejection on the reorganization plan. Then it augments the probability of failure of reorganization. Furthermore, the influence of negative coverage on the different stage on the success of material assets reorganization is different that it shows obvious timeliness. In addition, negative coverage relating to asset quality increases the probability of the voluntary termination of the reorganization plan. Negative coverage related to asset pricing improves the probability of Merge Reorga- nization Examination Committee＇s rejection on the reorganization plan. The results indicate that negative coverage plays a supervision and governance role on the process of material assets reorganiza- tion. Therefore, media coverage plays an active surveillance of the capital market. According to the finding of this study, we propose the following suggestions. Firstly, supervision departments should encourage the press to better play a supervisory role on capital mar- ket. Second, the press must be strictly self-disciplined and report objectively in performing the duty of gatekeeper. Only in this way, the press can be endorsed by more and more investors. Last but not least, listed companies should strengthen information disclosure. At the same time, public companies should enhance the awareness of crisis awareness.