基于多任务委托代理模型的导游激励问题研究

Study on Tour Guides' Incentive Problems in Tourism Management Based on Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model

运用多任务委托代理模型研究导游最优激励合同后得出,当小费、回扣为旅行社带来直接收益的情况时,在激励相容条件下,导游引导游览活动的最优激励合同是其绝对风险规避度、边际激励成本变化率和可观测变量方差的递减函数;导游赢得小费活动的最优激励合同为"临界型激励合同",即只有当导游所创造的收益超过某临界值,对其的激励才是正向的,若小于该临界值,激励将是负向的;导游获取回扣活动的最优激励合同只与其完成回扣任务的业绩有关;当小费和回扣不为旅行社带来直接收益的情况时,那么在激励相容条件下,导游在小费和回扣活动上的努力依赖于激励报酬,而且导游的最优激励合同与其在小费和回扣活动上的收益无关。

Using the multi-task principal-agent model, we analyze the tour guides＇ incentive contracts in two conditions. The paper finds that under incentive compatibility condition, when tip and kickback bring direct income to travel agency, the incentive contract of earning tips is critical. In other words, the incentive for tour guide will be positive only when the tour guide＇ s performance of tour guiding service satisfies the critical incentive condi- tions. Otherwise, it will be negative. The incentive contract of getting kickbacks is positively correlated with the tour guide＇ s performance of getting kickbacks. Under incentive compatibility condition, when tip and kickback do not bring direct income to travel agency, the efforts of tour guide on getting tips and kickbacks depend on the incentive rewards and the incentive contract is not correlated with the income of getting tips and kickbacks.