基于委托代理理论的高校设备资源内部共享研究

Study on internal sharing of university equipment resources based on principal-agent theory

鉴于我国高校仪器设备资源共享的研究已经进行了多年,相对于经验管理研究,理论上研究共享机制问题尚显不足。本文从设备资源共享的激励机制研究角度出发,利用委托代理理论中的不完全信息理论,从高校管理者角度探讨对拥有不同设备资源的院系实施有差别的激励措施。结果表明,要实现资源有效利用的最大化,对于拥有设备资源较为丰富的院系要给予科研利益上的激励措施,而设备资源水平较低的院系应给予经济利益上的激励手段。

In view of the research which has been carried out for years on the resource sharing of university instruments and equipment in our country,and compared with the experience management research,the theoretical research on the problem of sharing mechanism is still inadequate.From the perspective of research on incentive mechanism for the equipment resource sharing,by using the incomplete information theory from the principal-agent theory,and from the perspective of the university administrators,the exploration is conducted on implementing the differentiated incentive measures to the schools and departments which have the different equipment resources.The results show that to realize the maximization of the resource utilization,the schools and departments with rich equipment resources should be provided with scientific research incentive measures,while those with the lower level of the equipment resources should be offered with the incentive means of economic interests.