现象学伦理学的基本问题

The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenological Ethics

严格意义上的"现象学的伦理学"是一种反思—描述的伦理学。胡塞尔、哈特曼、耿宁的案例为我们提供了现象学伦理学的三种可能性,它们的共同特点都是在现象学反思中进行的对道德意识的有意无意的本质直观。这样一种现象学的伦理学与其说是一种价值伦理学,不如说是一种道德心理学或道德意识现象学。现象学的反思—描述伦理学与近代以来的规范伦理学的区别,非常类似于数学—逻辑学中的直觉主义与形式主义的差异。与后面两种数学理论一样,前面两种伦理学说也不能被理解为是非此即彼、相互排斥的。只是对它们之间的奠基关系的不同理解,会导向在伦理学思考中的两种不同立场:反思—描述伦理学的和规范伦理学的。这两种伦理学需要彼此互补才能最终构成完整的人类道德系统。

'Phenomenological ethics'in the strict sense is a sort of reflective-descriptive ethics.The cases of Husserl,Hartmann and Iso Kern have offered us three possibilities respectively with its common traits as eidetic intuition,conscious or unconscious,with regard to moral consciousness in phenomenological reflections.Phenomenological ethics as such is more of a moral psychology or a phenomenology of moral consciousness than an ethics of values.The difference between phenomenological reflective-descriptive ethics on the one hand and normative ethics since modern times on the other resembles,to a great extent,the difference between intuitionism and formalism in the milieu of mathematics-logics.Like the latter two mathematical theories,the former two ethics should not be understood as contradictory.Rather,different understandings regarding to the fundamental relationship between them may lead to two different stances in ethical thoughts:those of reflective-descriptive ethics and normative ethics which need to complete mutually before ultimately constituting a complete system of human ethics.