摘要
本文基于龙树的《中论颂》等著作,考察其哲学体系中"缘起"、"中道"、"不立自宗"和"二谛"几个关键概念,指出这些理论皆拱卫其认识论虚无主义立场,即一切概念唯是空名而无所指对象。龙树的缘起观否定了缘生法的存在,而将"缘起"等同于空性的无生之理。其中道观是由彻底否定以远离二边,而非调和二谛。其不立自宗的声明有助于避免虚无主义悖论,破尽一切概念而不确立任何概念。其二谛理论只是为了教化权便,而不是对空观做重新布局。因此,龙树的思想与后世中观论师以二谛为框架的理论体系有巨大差异。
This paper,based on a reading of Nāgārjuna's works,especially the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā,aims to investigate the significance of some key concepts in his context,such as the dependent origination,the middle position,the no-thesis position and the theory of the two truths,which thereby leads to a clarification that,these component thoughts are actually elaborate defenses of his nihilistic epistemological position as proposed in my previous papers.Nāgārjuna reinterprets the dependent origination in a negative sense and equates it with the emptiness,yet explicitly denies the existence of dependently originated dharmas.His middle position is secured through pure negation,rather than through any mode of compromise between these two truths.He further propounds a no-thesis position in order to avoid the paradox of nihilism.His exposition of the two truths aims at building a pedagogical path and making a soteriological mechanism possible,rather than to reshape the philosophical map of the emptiness.Therefore,there is an obvious gap between Nāgārjuna's philosophy and that of his later interpreter Mādhyamikas'.However,the two theories of truth underpin the whole system.
出处
《世界哲学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第2期148-159,共12页
World Philosophy