证券执法加强了分析师的监督治理作用吗

Does Security Law Enforcement Strengthen Analysts' role as External Monitors

本文考察了针对证券分析师的第一次执法事件对分析师作为公司外部治理监督者作用的影响。我们发现,相比于2006年《证券法》修订案实施之前,在针对分析师的处罚事件之后,分析师跟踪显著抑制了上市公司的盈余管理程度,考虑内生性问题后得到的实证结果进一步支持了上述发现。我们还进一步发现,执法对明星分析师的影响更显著,且机构投资者对明星分析师发挥外部治理监督作用具有显著影响。因此,本文认为,证券执法比立法更为重要。

The paper investigates the change of analysts＇ role as external monitors around the event of the amendment of security law and its first execution after its getting effective. Using the sample from 2004 to 2015, we find that before the amendment of securi- ty law become effective and its first execution after its getting effective, analysts did not have any effect as external monitors. But after the event of law enforcement in 2007, analysts＇ following significantly lowers the extent of earning management of listed companies, after considering the endogenous problem, empirical results lend further support to the above findings. We further find that the en- forcement has a stronger effect on stars, meanwhile, the institutional investors exert influence on stars as performing monitoring. These findings strongly imply that law enforcement is more important than law itself.