政府补贴捐赠下的再制造决策及激励影响研究

Research on Remanufacturing Decision Making and Incentive Effects under Government Subsidies and Corporate Donations

文章基于再制造品质量优、成本低的特点,提出了政府补贴-企业捐赠的再制造品激励政策,构建了政府补贴下制造商销售和捐赠再制造品的数量模型,通过分析完全垄断和寡头竞争两种市场下的制造商决策,研究发现:只有政府补贴满足一定的阈值范围,捐赠和销售行为才会同时发生,但竞争削弱了政府补贴的激励作用,随着竞争强度的增加,需要更高的政府补贴才足以有效激励制造商;捐赠行为会导致再制造品销售产生溢价效应,一定范围内的政府补贴会强化溢价效应;捐赠行为会蚕食再制造品的销售量,竞争强度增加会削弱蚕食效应;捐赠行为增加了再制造品的总需求量,刺激了EOL产品的再循环利用,更多的再制造品产生了积极的环境效益,同时也改善了经济效益。

Based on good quality and low cost of remanufactured products, this paper proposes remanufacturing incentive policy of government subsidies- corporate donations and constructs the quantitative model of sales of manufactures and donations of remanufactured products based on government subsidies. By analyzing decisions of manufactures under monopoly and oligopoly markets, the paper finds that：Only when government subsidies meet certain threshold range can donations and sales of remanufacturers occur simultaneously. But the competition weakens the incentives of government subsidies. With the increase of the intensity of competition, more government subsidies are needed to effectively motivate manufacturers; Sales of manufactured goods will generate premium effect caused by donations, and appropriate government subsidies will strengthen the premium effect; Donations will erode sales of manufactured goods, whereas the increase of intensity of competitions will weaken eroded effect; Donations increase the total demand of remanufactured goods, stimulate the recycling and reusing of EOL products. In addition, more manufactured goods bring positive environmental benefits, and improve economic efficiency.