政府持股与银行机构的稳定性——基于中国中小银行的经验证据

Government Ownership and Banking Stability——Empirical Evidence from Small and Medium Banks in China

利用修正距离破产概率指数(Z-score)和银行危机概率指数(PD-score)衡量银行稳定,运用39家股份制商业银行和城市商业银行2007—2012年的面板数据,实证研究政府持股等与银行稳定的关系,得出如下研究结论:其一,股份制商业银行的稳定性低于城市商业银行;其二,政府持股与银行稳定呈负相关关系,而且政府间接持股比直接持股更倾向于不利于银行稳定;其三,样本期间的GDP高速增长并未提高银行的稳定性,相反增加了银行发生危机事件的可能性。银行业监管部门应加强对中型银行稳定性的监管,加强处于政府间接持股地位的国有企业和银行关联交易等的监管,以及在经济较快增长时期及时提示银行潜在的相关风险。

Using a unique bank-level panel data of 39 Chinese commercial banks including joint-stock commercial banks and city commercial banks from 2007 to 2012,the paper analyzes how government ownership comprehensively influences bank stability with two different measures of bank stability： Z-score, a standard measure of distance from insolvency, and PD-score, the distress probabilities derived from hazard models. We draw the following conclusions. First,joint-stock commercial banks are less stable than city commercial banks. Second, government ownership is negatively related with banking stability, and government indirect stake holding tends to be more disadvantageous to bank stability compared with government direct holding. Third,GDP growth does not increase bank stability during the period of samples;on the contrary,it increase the probability of distress. It is pointed out that the banking supervision department should strengthen the supervision of the stability of medium-sized banks, intensify the supervision of the related transactions between banks and the state-owned enterprises which are indirectly owned by the government, and at the same time prompt the bank potential risks timely in the period of rapid economic growth.