我国农业保险不对称信息实证研究

An Empirical Study on Information Asymmetry of Agriculture Insurance

近年来,我国自然灾害频发、风险日趋多样,农业保险作为对农业风险损失进行补偿的制度,是维护一国农业可持续运行的稳定器。国内外农业保险的实践经验表明,信息不对称问题对农业保险发展的阻碍不容小觑,不对称信息问题也伴随着我国农业保险的发展渐渐凸显。文章采用国内10家产险公司2007~2014年共8年的177份地区承保汇总数据,运用二项回归模型和条件相关模型对我国农业保险中是否存在信息不对称问题进行了实证分析,发现我国农业保险市场上存在着一定程度的道德风险和逆向选择。在此基础上,从缓解农业保险信息不对称问题的角度提出了相关建议,以促进我国农业保险市场的健康持续发展。

As a regime compensating for agricultural risks and losses, agricuhural insurance is a stabilizer for maintaining sustainable development of a country＇s agricultural industry, especially when agricultural production is facing with frequent natural disasters and diverse risks in recent years. The domestic and foreign agricultural insurance practices have confirmed that asymmetric information is a big problem hindering the development of agricultural insurance. With the development of agricultural insurance in our country, the asymmetric information problem gradually emerges. The paper selected underwriting data of 10 domestic property insurers in 177 regions during 2007 -2014, and conducted an exponential analysis on the existence of information asymmetry of agricultural insurance, using the binary regression model and the conditional correlation model. The research revealed the existence of moral hazard and adverse selection to different extents. Thus, we put forward suggestions on solving the informa- tion asymmetry problem in order to promote healthy and sustainable development of agricultural insurance in China.