下游企业监督与政府介入对供应商减排影响的分析

Analysis of Downstream Firm's Supervising and Governmental Intervention on Supplier's Emission Reduction

考虑了由一个供应商和一个下游企业组成的供应链,研究了当供应商的生产污染排放会降低消费者对下游企业产品的需求时,下游企业通过监督敦促供应商降低排放,以及政府通过对供应商的生产污染征收惩罚税或对其减排投入进行补贴以达到保护环境目的。将生产污染排放对环境造成的负面影响纳入社会福利计算,通过数值仿真,给出了在消费者环保意识强弱和供应商初始排放程度不同的情况下,企业的利润,生产对环境造成的负面影响和社会福利,以及政府和企业的均衡选择。结果表明,当没有政府介入时,下游企业敦促供应商减排总是能提升下游企业的利润,但会降低供应商的利润,此时只有当下游企业给予供应商超过其利润损失的一定补贴额,供应商与下游企业才会就减排程度达成一致;当政府介入时,多数情况下,政府会选择补贴供应商,而下游企业不会去敦促供应商减排;少数情况下,政府会选择对供应商征税,而下游企业也会敦促供应商减排。

In practice, some firms in the downstream supply chain often outsource production processes that have high greenhouse gas emission and low value to upstream suppliers. Thus, the suppliers＇ environmental performance will directly influence consumers＇ valuation about the products of the downstream firms. The increasingly strict environmental law and public pressures are forcing downstream supply chain finns to start to pay attention to environmental performance of their upstream suppliers and to force them implement green supply chain management. To protect the environment, some local governments impose penalty tax on firms because their production＇s gas emissions damage environment. Other governments encourage firms＇ gas emission reductioninvestment via financial subsidy. The purpose of this paper is to investigate environmental performance of a supply chain which consists of an upstream supplier and a downstream f＇n-m. The downstream firm may supervise the supplier＇s emission reduction effort and the government may provide subsidy for the supplier＇s emission reduction behavior or impose tax on the supplier due to environmental damages caused by high gas emission. If customers can observe the gas emissions, a higher （lower） gas emission will lead to a lower （higher） demand. Firstly, a supply chain model without downstream firm＇s supervising and governmental intervention is set up. Based on the maximum profit of fn＇ms, the optimal equilibriums are obtained. Secondly, when considering the downstream firm＇s supervising, a Nash bargaining model on the supplier＇s emission reduction level per unit of output produced is set up for the supplier and downstream finns. Thirdly, when considering governmental intervention, a penalty tax may be imposed on the suppliers to force them to largely reduce gas emissions. Or an incentive subsidy may be provided for the supplier to encourage more emission reduction. To solve the equilibrium decision of government in maximizing social welfare, environmental impact of supplier＇s production emissions is involved in social welfare function. Finally, the model of considering both downstream firm＇s supervising and governmental intervention is developed. A numerical example is presented to show the equilibriums of these models and the optimal choices of firms and government. The results show that when customers＇ environmental awareness increases, both total environmental impact and social welfare decrease, The downstream firm＇s supervising will certainly reduce the total environmental impact. In most cases, it does not matter whether the downstream finn will choose to supervise the supplier or not, the total environmental impact and social welfare will not be affected when the government chooses subsidy. Ifa subsidy is present, firms and environment will be better than those without subsidy. Hence, the government is more likely to choose to provide subsidy and the downstream firm will not supervise the supplier＇s gas emission reduction effort. In a few cases when environmental impact is too large, taxation may be the optimal choice for the government and the downstream firm will choose to supervise the supplier＇s gas emission reduction investment. In summary, this research considers supply chain members＇ supervising over gas emission reduction and governmental financial intervention. Many managerial implications are drawn from the findings. Future researches may want to study the competition among suppliers or downstream firms, and information asymmetry between firms and government. Information asymmetry could include finns＇ false reports used to cheat for more governmental subsidy or taxation elusion. Information asymmetry between supply chain members for market demand is also worth discussing.