基于政府补贴的制造企业生产战略决策研究

Manufacturers' Production Strategies Based on Government Subsidies

政府环境规制是推进再制造产业发展的重要政策。针对制造企业再制造生产战略实施动力不足的现实国情,设计政府直接补贴制造企业与直接补贴消费者两种不同的激励契约。考虑消费者对再制造产品的偏好程度,基于两种不同补贴方式分别建立政府与制造企业博弈的双层规划模型。比较分析两种补贴方式下政府补贴力度分别对制造企业实施再制造生产战略的影响,讨论各参数变化对制造企业决策和收益的影响。研究表明:政府加大对制造企业的补贴力度,将降低再制造产品市场价格,加大对消费者补贴力度,将提高再制造产品市场价格;政府两种不同的补贴激励机制均增加再制造产品市场占有率,提高制造企业收益。研究结论对再制造产业发展初期政府环境规制的制定和制造企业的运营决策具有现实指导意义。

With limited resources and the increased of environmental protection, recycling renewable resources has become an important sustainable development strategy of national economy. With the rapid development of China＇s economy, the issues related to the use of limited resources and environmental pressures have become increasingly prominent. The government tries to address these issues by stressing the importance of recycling waste products in the manufacturing industry. How and what manufacturers have done in order to cope with the increasingly stringent environmental regulations have become a hot research topic. The current study primarily examines the impact of government regulation on manufacturing operations strategy, and the influence of government subsidies on operating decisions of the manufacturing enterprise. However, these researches assume that it is a static game between the government and enterprises. Different fiom the previous study considering the relationship between government and manufacturers as static, this study treats it as a dynamic game relation to reflect the real situation. This study adopts two different incentive systems in which manufacturers and consumers receive subsidy by the government directly. In addition, customer preference for remanufactured product and government subsidies and other factors were considered. Moreover, a bilevel programming model between the government and manufacturers under two allowance methods was established with game theory. The influence of the adjustment factor on the remanufactured products＇ prices were discussed. This paper also analyzed the changing trends in the market share of the two different products with government subsidies. More discussion was spent on the relationships between consumers＇ degree of disapproval for the remanufactured product and the subsidies coefficient consumers received. A comparison of those two government subsidy methods was made to understand their influence on manufacturers＇ remanufactured strategy. A numerical simulation was conducted to investigate the influence of various factors in the early stage ofremanufacturing industry＇s development on manufacturers＇ decision-making and expected profits. The simulation results show that more allowances will reduce the remanufactured products＇ price in the market. However, product price will increase when consumers have more subsidies. In conclusion, the two allowance methods are effective at enhancing the remanufactured products＇ disapproval rate, and improving the manufacturing enterprises＇ profit. In addition, the higher consumers＇ disapproval rate for the remanufactured product the higher the remanufactured product＇s price and market share will be increased. The conclusions are helpful for the design of the government＇s environmental policy and the operation of manufacturing enterprises in the early stage of remanufactttring industry＇s development.