资金互助组织“隧道行为”及其抑制措施——以苏北22家资金互助社为例

Farmers' Mutual Financial Cooperative "Tunnel Behavior" and Its Restraining Measures:Evidence from 22 Farmers' Credit Union Funds

以农民资金互助社为代表的合作金融组织作为普惠金融的重要组成部分,其能否良好运行对于发展普惠金融具有重要意义。本文运用苏北22家农民资金互助社2009-2014年年度财务报告数据,考察核心社员"隧道行为"及其"隧道"挖掘工具。结果显示,当外部监督部门不限制农民资金互助社盈余分配比重时,核心社员投入股金比例越高,其越倾向于通过减少留存盈余、增加社员盈余分配的方式实现"隧道行为";随着外部监管部门限制农民资金互助社社员分配盈余比重,核心社员投入股金比例越高,其越倾向于通过增加工资进行"隧道"挖掘。限制核心社员投入股金比例,增强内部稽核机制,能够抑制核心社员的"隧道行为"。

Cooperative financial institutions, represented by Farmers＇ Mutual Financial Coop- eratives, are an important component of inclusive finance and therefore, the operation of these in- stitutions is worth studying. In this paper,we use the data disclosed in the 2009-2014 Annual Fi- nancial Report of 22 Farmers＇Cooperatives in the north of Jiangsu Province to examine the ＂tun- nel behavior＂ of the core members and their tunnel excavation tools. The results show that at the initial period of mutual funds when the external supervision did not regulate the distribution of dividends of the mutual funds, the larger portion the core members invested, the more likely it was for the core members to realize the ＂ tunnel behavior＂ mainly by reducing the retained earnings and increasing the distribution of members. With the strengthening of external supervision of dis- tribution of dividends later on, the larger portion the core members invested, the more likely it was for the core members to realize tunnel mining mainly by increasing their wages. It is necessary to set up an effective internal audit mechanism by restricting the investment portion of core members of peasant capital mutual aid clubs, establishing democratic governance within peasant capital mutual aid societies,and restraining the ＂ tunnel behavior＂ of core members of peasant capital mutual aid societies.