摘要
简要介绍建筑交易体制的性质;从新制度经济学演化学派的视角出发,讨论建筑交易体制内生化的必要性,分析它的演进规律;采用贪婪者–分享者–中庸者三人博弈模型揭示建筑交易体制演化均衡的某些特征,多重均衡、路径依赖和对初始条件的敏感性,以及帕累托无效结果的长期存在。
The paper briefly introduces the nature of the construction business system. Then, discusses the necessity of endogenizing the system, analyzes its evolutionary laws from the perspective of neo-institutionary economics. Finally, uses the Grabber-Sharer-Bourgeois game model to illustrate some characteristic outcomes of evolutionary equilibrium of the construction business system： multiple equilibria, path-dependence and original- state-sensitiveness, as well as the long term persistence of Pareto-inferior outcomes.
出处
《建筑经济》
2017年第3期5-7,共3页
Construction Economy
关键词
建筑交易体制
内生化
演化博弈论
低水平均衡
construction business system
endogenization
evolutionary game theory
low-level equilibrium
