威廉姆森对先验-后验之分的两个挑战

Williamson's Two Challenges to the A Priori- A Posteriori Distinction

自康德以来,先验-后验之分就在哲学中扮演着重要的角色。但是,威廉姆森在最近的著作中对其认识论价值提出挑战。他的论证可以区分成两个不同的挑战:一是某些基于想象的知识案例并不能恰当的归类为先验或后验;二是此类反例可以扩展到先验或后验的范例,前者包括逻辑和数学知识,后者包括科学知识。尽管他的第一个挑战可以得到合理的辩护,第二个挑战却面临难以克服的困难。即使威廉姆森成功地给出了不能适当地归类为先验或后验的例子,他将其反例推广到先验和后验之范例的尝试也并未成功。因此,那些试图坚持认为先验-后验之分具有重要价值的人仍然可以通过接受第三类知识来避免威廉姆森的一般性批评。

Ever since Kant, the distinction between a priori and a posteriori has long been supposed to play a significant role in philosophy. However, Timothy Williamson challenged its epistemological significance in recent works. His arguments can be viewed as two distinct challenges. While the first challenge is defensible, the second one is not. Even if Williamson succeeds in showing cases of knowledge which are not happily classified as a priori or a posteriori, he still fails to generalize them to cover paradigm cases of a priori and a posteriofi knowledge. Therefore, those who appreciate the signifi- cance of the a priori - a posteriori distinction still have a way out of Williamson＇ s general criticism, viz. , embracing his cases as the third category.