摘要
以经济学、尤其博弈论理解科学规则凸显认识规则与社会规则的联合、社会规则的认识意义,说明了在缺乏单一方法论共识时的科学认识状况。科学规则有必要存在,否则科学活动会出现零和博弈。科学规则的生成进路分为个体效用最大化假设、突现论和契约论,来源有内在论和外在论,这些在科学知识经济学中尚有争议。科学规则与个体利益的关系复杂多变,与科学目标关系的松散性令其区别于以往观点。
Understanding scientific rules in the view of economics, especially game theory, highlights the union of epistemic and social rules, the episte- mic significance of social rules, and the epistemic state of science in the absence of a single methodological consensus. It is necessary for scientific rules to exit in scientific activity, or there will be a zero - sum game. The generation of scientific rules are divided into three approaches : assumption of maximi- zing individual utility, emergence and contract theory, and there are two kinds of sources : internalism and externalism. All of these are still controversial in economics of scientific knowledge. The relationship between scientific rules and individual interest is complex and varied. The looseness of the relation- ship between scientific rules and objectives is different from the past.
作者
王一雪
WANG Yi - xue(Department of Philosophy, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, China)
出处
《自然辩证法研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第3期27-33,共7页
Studies in Dialectics of Nature
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目"当代西方科学论的经济学转向研究"(12YJA720019)
关键词
科学规则
经济学
生成
来源
个体利益
scientific rules
economics
generation
source
private interest