产业政策、政府支持与公司投资效率研究

Industrial Policy, Government Support and Corporate Investment Efficiency

本文研究产业政策、政府支持与公司投资效率的关系。研究发现,相对未受产业政策鼓励或未受产业政策重点支持的公司,受产业政策鼓励或重点支持公司的政府补助、长期负债较多,且该结果在省委书记或省长任期较长条件下更为显著;与此同时,公司政府补助、长期负债越多,其投资水平越高,投资效率越低,过度投资程度越高;进一步地,相对未受产业政策鼓励或未受产业政策重点支持阶段,受产业政策鼓励或重点支持阶段的公司政府补助、长期负债与投资水平(投资效率)的正(负)相关关系更强,过度投资也更为严重。研究表明,为促进地区经济发展,地方政府偏好基于国家产业政策,为本地区公司提供资金支持;然而,政府与公司间的信息不对称问题可能降低资源配置效率,引发公司过度投资,影响产业政策实施效果。本文不仅为产业政策实施的负面效应研究提供了证据,还拓展并丰富了政策不确定性与公司投资行为、产业政策与公司决策的相关研究。本文研究结论对产业政策实施的市场体系建设具有重要启示。

This paper investigates whether the efficiency of corporate investment is affected by industrial policy through government support.Using a sample of Chinese listed firms,we show that firms encouraged by industrial policy tend to receive more government subsidy and long term loan;the result is more significant in conditions where Secretary of the provincial Party Committee or Governors have longer tenure.Meanwhile,the more government subsidy or long term loan firms obtain,the higher level of investment the firms have,and investment efficiency tend to be lower,over-investment is more severe.Moreover,the effects are more significant for firms with industry policy encouragement and support.The above evidence is consistent with the conjecture that in order to propel regional economic growth,local government usually prefer to support local firms according to national industry policy.However,the information asymmetry problem may lower resource allocation efficiency and cause over-investment,which distorts the implementation of national industry policy.This paper not only provides evidence for the negative effects of the implementation of industrial policy,but also expands and enriches the researches of policy uncertainty and corporate investment behavior,and industrial policy and corporate decision-making.The conclusions of this paper have important implications for the construction of the market system of industrial policy implementation.