考虑TPL主导优先权的生鲜农产品供应链协调

Coordination in a Fresh Agri-products Supply Chain Considering TPL Service Provider's Leading Priority

在零售价格和物流服务水平影响市场需求的前提下,研究了由供应商、TPL服务商和零售商组成的生鲜农产品三级供应链协调问题。基于不同的主导优先权,建立了TPL/供应商主导两种运作模式下的序贯非合作博弈模型,发现TPL主导下的物流服务水平和订购量均低于供应商主导的情形;TPL主导致使其自身利润增加,而其他成员利润减少。进一步在两种模式下,引入物流服务成本共担和收入共享契约,均可实现系统的协调。在特定条件下比较了契约参数的大小,并分析了上述契约组合在两种主导模式下的运作效果及管理意义。最后,通过算例对收入共享契约的参数进行灵敏度分析,验证了所得到的结论。

This paper studies the coordination in a three-echelon and fresh agri-products supply chain consisting of a supplier,a TPL service provider and a retailer by assuming the market demand depending on logistics service level and retail price.Based on different modes of leading priority,we establish two sequential non-cooperative game models respectively led by TPL or supplier.We find that the logistics service level and order quantity in TPL-led model are lower than the corresponding result in supplier-led one.TPL＇s leading priority can result in the increase of its own profits and decrease of other members＇ profits.Then,we coordinate both two models successfully by designing a combination contract including revenue sharing and logistics service cost sharing contract.The contract parameters are compared under certain conditions and then the operation effect and management meaning are analyzed under two dominant modes.Finally,we conduct a sensitivity analysis of the revenue sharing contract parameters and verify the conclusions.