技术许可的讨价还价模型

The Bargaining Model of Technology Licensing

针对现有文献大多忽视技术被许可方的议价能力问题,在一个双边垄断的框架之内,运用轮流出价的讨价还价模型,讨论了技术许可的价格契约.研究表明,当双方的时间贴现率反映各自议价成本的高低时,双方议价成本的相对大小决定其讨价还价的能力,也决定了各自对新增利润的分割;同时,说明了技术许可方拥有全部议价能力只是讨价还价模型的一种极端情形.模型对现实更有解释力,拓展了现有的研究思路.

Aim at the neglect of the licensee＇s bargaining power in many literatures,a bargain model counteroffer is set up to discuss the technology license contract within the framework in a bilateral monopoly.Research shows that the ability of the bargaining and profit distribution are determined by its relative size of the bargaining cost when both the rate of time discount reflect their level of bargaining cost.And the case that the Licensor has all the bargaining power is one extreme for the bargain model,which owns more power to illustrate the practical problems,and expands the research ideas existing.