基于系统动力学的城市生活垃圾发电进化博弈

Analysis of an Evolutionary Game under Municipal Solid Waste Incineration Power Generation Based on System Dynamics

为了降低垃圾焚烧发电所导致的环境污染,促使垃圾焚烧发电厂在垃圾处理过程中采取绿色无害化处理,基于有限理性的假设,运用进化博弈论来分析中央政府、地方政府和垃圾焚烧发电企业三方在生活垃圾处理过程中的决策,建立三方进化博弈模型,并运用系统动力学对三方进化博弈过程进行动态模拟仿真。仿真结果表明,三方的策略选择反复波动,不存在进化稳定策略。因此,引入动态惩罚和动态奖励策略试图对波动进行控制。通过仿真发现,动态惩罚可以有效地抑制波动,使三方的策略选择趋于稳定。通过敏感性分析,分别提高对地方政府和企业的最高惩罚标准。通过比较发现,提高企业的最高处罚标准不仅可以有效地抑制波动,还可以有效提高垃圾焚烧发电企业实行垃圾绿色处理的概率,使之趋近于1。

Based on the assumption of bounded rationality, an evolutionary game model is proposed to analyze the decision among the central government, local government and MSW incineration power enterprises in waste disposing process while trying to reduce the environment pollution caused by municipal solid waste （MSW） incineration with electricity generation and promote MSW incineration power enterprises to dispose the waste in a green process. System dynamics is applied to analyze the stability of three stakeholders and identify equilibrium solutions. The simulation results show that the strategy selections of the three stakeholders fluctuate repeatedly, which indicates that the evolutionary stable strategy does not exist among the stakeholders. Therefore, dynamic penalty and dynamic reward are proposed to control the fluctuations. According to the sensitivity analysis, the simulation results indicate that the dynamic penalty can effectively restrain the fluctuations and make stakeholders more stable. Furthermore, compared with raising local government maximum penalty standard, raising the enterprise maximum penalty standard can not only restrain the fluctuations effectively but also present an ideal evolutionary stable strategy in which the probability of MSW incineration power enterprises to increase their probability to dispose waste in green process is closed to 1.