非对称生产成本变动信息下零售商双渠道的最优契约设计

The Optimal Contract Design with Asymmetric Production Cost Disruption Information in a Dual-channel Model of Retailer

为研究制造商非对称生产成本变动信息对以大型零售商为主导的零售商双渠道供应链契约设计的影响,分别考虑了无生产成本变动、制造商生产成本变动且信息对称与信息不对称3种情况下的最优渠道策略,以消费者选择理论和委托代理理论为基础,利用KKT条件求解,分析了非对称信息下成本变动对供应链绩效的影响。研究表明,初始的供应链渠道策略在一定条件下仍为最优策略;且制造商生产成本信息的私有性,也并不一定会给供应链系统带来收益损失。

To investigate the impact of the asymmetric production cost disruption information on the retailer dual-channel supply chain contract, in which the retailer plays the main role in supply chain, the optimal channel strategy under the three situations of no production cost disruption, production cost disruption under the symmetric information and asymmetric information are considered respectively. Based on the consumer choice theory and the principal-agent theory, the influence of cost disruption on supply chain performance under the asymmetric information is analyzed using KKT （Karush-Kuhn- Tucker） condition. It is suggested that the original supply chain strategy is still the optimal choice under certain conditions. In addition, the information privacy of production cost disruption not always brings the loss of the profit of the entire supply chain.