期刊文献+

政府激励下集群企业合作创新机制博弈仿真分析 被引量:1

Dynamic Game Analysis on Governmental incentives' effects on Cluster Enterprise' Cooperation Innovation
下载PDF
导出
摘要 在演化博弈模型的基础上,引入政府因素到集群合作创新活动中,采用两阶段博弈,比较分析无政府激励、有政府激励两种情况下的动态均衡,探讨政府在集群合作创新中的作用,以及作用程度和作用效果,为政府创新驱动发展提供依据。研究结果表明:政府激励集群企业合作创新,应该把握好"度",既要全面节约和高效利用政府资源,又要引导集群企业合作创新行为;政府与市场只有形成合力,才能促进集群企业的合作创新,提高集群企业创新绩效,进而提升区域整体创新能力和竞争优势。 This article, based on the evolutionary game model, compares the dynamic balances with govern- mental incentives and those without governmental incentives, and analyzes the governmental influences on cluster enterprises' cooperation innovation and how they work, which will provide some insights into governmental efforts during innovation. It is concluded that when motivating the cooperation innovation of cluster enterprises, govern- ments should be moderate in their efforts. It should strive to save governmental resources as well as to make full use of it, lead cooperation innovation among those enterprises in a proper way. It is recommended that only when the government and the market make joint efforts can it truly motivate the innovation among cluster enterprises, improve the efficiency of innovation and therefore enhance regional innovation ability and its competitiveness.
作者 刘权 张聪群
机构地区 宁波大学商学院
出处 《中国发展》 2017年第1期67-74,共8页 China Development
基金 国家社会科学基金项目"核心企业创新驱动产业集群升级的机理与模式研究"(15BGL030)
关键词 产业集群 合作创新 政府激励 市场制约 演化博弈 cluster enterprises cooperation innovation governmental incentives market restriction evolu- tionary game theory
  • 相关文献

参考文献8

二级参考文献106

共引文献1008

同被引文献10

引证文献1

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部