摘要
增加高科技公司研发投入是实施好创新驱动发展战略的关键。本文以我国高科技上市公司为样本,基于市场失灵理论、寻租理论和公司资源理论,探讨政府创新补贴的配置状况,并检验其对高科技公司研发投入的影响,以探讨我国科技政策改革的优化路径。研究发现,当公司高管具有研发技术背景或政治关联背景时,高科技公司均可以获得更多创新补贴资源;高管研发技术背景可以有效增加高科技公司研发投入,但政治关联背景无法提升研发投入。进一步分析显示,当公司所处地区的知识产权保护程度越高时,高管研发技术背景对高科技公司研发投入的促进效果更加显著,具有研发技术背景的高管更加注重公司研发投入,而政治关联背景显著地提高了员工冗余程度。可见,通过政治关联获得创新补贴时,公司付出了社会性代价(如超额雇员);高管研发技术背景是高科技公司重要的人力(知识)资本,政府需要引导高科技公司积累人力资本,增加创新投入。
Promoting and enhancing the high-tech research and development(R&D) investment is the key to the better implementation of innovation-driven development strategy. Based on market failure theory, rent-seeking theory and the theory of corporate resources,this paper attempts to document the allocation of government innovative subsidies and examine its impact on high-tech R&D investment, using the samples of high-tech listed companies. We find that when executives have developed technical background or political connection background, the high-teeh companies are access to more subsidies for R&D; and that executives with the technical background of R&D can effectively increase high-tech companies R&D investment,but political connection can not significantly enhance the R&D investment. Further analysis shows that the positive effcet of executives R&D technical background on promoting R&D investment is more pronounced where there is higher degree of intellectual property protection. Furthermore, we explore that executives have developed technical background can pay more attention to company R&D investment,but political affiliates significantly increase the degree of employees redundancy. Obviously, when the innovation subsidies are obtained through political connection, the companies pay a social expenses (such as employees redundancy). Executives' R&D background is an important human (knowledge) capital for high-tech enterprises,the government needs to guide high-tech enterprises focus on the accumulation of human capital,increasing innovative investment.
作者
彭红星
毛新述
PENG Hongxing MAO Xinshu(Beijing Technology and Business University, 100048)
出处
《财贸经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第3期147-160,F0003,共15页
Finance & Trade Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目"高管团队的权力分布及其经济后果研究"(71672003)
北京市社会科学基金青年项目"政府研发补贴对北京市科技企业创新绩效的影响及其优化路径研究"(16GLC044)
国有资产管理协同创新中心项目"国有企业集团治理与管理控制研究"(GZ20131002)
关键词
创新补贴
高管背景
研发投入
Innovative Subsidies, Executives Background, R&D Investment