机构投资者持股、管理者过度自信与非效率投资

Institutional Investor Ownership, Managerial Overconfidence and Inefficient Investment

本文以2010-2014年沪深A股上市公司数据为样本,实证检验机构投资者对管理者过度自信与非效率投资关系的影响。研究发现:管理者过度自信与企业非效率投资呈正相关关系,机构投资者整体持股可以抑制管理者过度自信对企业非效率投资的影响;大机构投资者和稳定型机构投资者能够抑制管理者过度自信与企业非效率投资的正相关关系,而小机构投资者和交易型机构投资者则没有起到抑制作用。

This paper selects 2010-2014 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as sample data, empirically tests the influence of institutional investors on the relationship between managerial overconfidence and inefficient investment. The study finds that managerial overconfidence and inefficient investment are positively correlated. Institutional investor ownership can inhibit the effect of managerial overconfidence on corporate inefficient investment. Furthermore, we probes the influence of institutional investors heterogeneity on the relationship between managerial overconfidence and inefficient investment from the aspects of the proportion of institutional investors' holdings and stability of holdings. The results show that large institutional investors and stable institutional investors can inhibit the effect of managerial overconfidence on corporate inefficient investment, but small institutional investors and transactional institutional investors do not have the inhibition.