经理人权力与员工工资——来自五百家非上市公司的证据

Managerial Entrenchment and Workers' Pay——Evidence from Five Hundred Chinese Non-listed Firms

有权力的经理人会支付给员工更高还是更低的工资?现有的几种主流的委托代理理论给出了完全不同的预测。本文提出,一个有权力的经理人对待员工的态度取决于他在追逐哪一类的私人收益,而后者进一步取决于劳动力保护等外部环境和大股东监督力度等内部治理结构。本文提出四个具体的假说,并使用一套中国非上市公司的数据来检验。实证分析发现:若总经理的权力大于最大的股东,则企业支付给蓝领和白领工人的工资都更低。通过对中国劳动力市场和产品市场以及非上市公司的特征的描述,本文认为,在这样的环境下,有权力的经理人有着很强的动机来通过削减员工工资以增强短期内的业绩。此外,有些因素会显著地影响经理人削减工资的幅度,包括:企业内部劳工的力量以及所在区域的劳动保护程度、内部公司治理结构、外部产品市场的竞争程度,以及企业更关注于长期还是短期的发展。

Do entrenched managers pay their workers more？ This paper proposes a unified framework to understand the opposite relationships between managerial entrenchment and workers＇ pay that are indicated by various existing theories. How entrenched managers treat employees depends on what private benefits they pursue, which further hinges on several decisive factors. The paper then provides evidence from analyzing Chinese non-listed firms to complement existing evidence primarily obtained from examining public firms in developed economies. An entrenched CEO is found to be significantly associated with reduced average firm-level wages for both blue-collar and white-collar workers. Based on features of China＇s labor market, production market, and non-listed firms, we argue that entrenched managers in sample firms have strong incentives to cut workers＇ pay for short-term performance. We also find the effects are largely influenced by the strength of internal labor power and external labor protection, the level of corporate governance, pressure from production market competition, and firms＇ horizon of focus.